Introduction
The "Leviathan" motive of politicians to maximize their power is a central assumption of the public choice approach to political economy.' This approach has been strongly attacked for underestimating the importance of competitive checks on politicians; Wittman (1989 Wittman ( , 1995 in particular broadly argues that electoral competition is an effective solution to whatever principalagent problem might exist between politicians and voters. Yet recent research in political economy (Dixit and Londregan 1995 , 1996 , 1998 Grossman and Helpman 1996) casts renewed doubt on the efficiency of political markets. Formal models incorporating imperfections in the electoral process show that politicians have the latitude to deviate somewhat from citizen interests. Although politicians face constraints, they retain some measure of monopoly power, a conclusion consistent with the public choice literature.
The main difference between recent political economy and the public choice tradition arises from their assumptions about politicians' objective functions. The public choice approach tends to view all political parties as power maximizers, whereas others see parties as either vote maximizers Londregan 1995, 1996; Grossman and Helpman 1996) or promoters of conflicting ideologies (Alesina and Rosenthal 1995; Dixit and Londregan 1998). The present paper briefly develops a theoretical model that pits Leviathan-in the form of two powermaximizing parties-against the electoral constraints of modem political economy. The main implication of the model-an implication empirically tested against several alternatives later in
Related Literature
The model developed here builds on the formal theory of recent political economy, the less formal analysis of government found in the public choice literature, and the broader debate about the extent to which politicians find themselves constrained to efficiently satisfy consumer preferences.
The conclusions of my model, like most recent work in theoretical political economy, depend critically on the existence of an imperfection in the electoral process: Voters treat political parties as differentiated products. A literature beginning with Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) differentiates parties by assuming that they may easily alter their positions on some issues (such as the budget) but must hold their stance on other issues (such as abortion) fixed. Recent advances made on this foundation include those of Dixit and Londregan (1995 , 1996 , 1998 ) and Grossman and Helpman (1996) . This assumption is not ad hoc: As Dixit and Londregan (1998) note, voters genuinely care about ideology, and even in the face of repeated electoral defeats, parties find it difficult to make genuine ideological shifts. Fixed ideological positions plus voter ideology adds up to imperfect political competition.2 Although a growing literature builds on Lindbeck and Weibull's approach, there is much less consensus about parties' objective functions. Wittman (1983) provides a general discussion of the implications of politicians' preferences over policies as well as electoral outcomes. Some, such as Grossman and Helpman (1996) and Londregan (1995, 1996) , simply model parties as vote maximizers. Others, such as Baron (1994) , assume parties maximize their probability of victory. In Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) , one party has a progoverment ideology while the other has an antigovernment ideology; Dixit and Londregan (1998) have parties max- imize a weighted average of their vote share and an ideological social welfare function. Electoral competition forces both parties to compromise their ideologies to some extent. Vote-maximizing and conflicting ideologies theories of political motivation differ from the power-maximizing or "Leviathan" parties often posited within the public choice literature. Brennan and Buchanan (1980) , for example, assume that both Democrats and Republicans want to make government revenue and spending as large as possible. They only refrain from increasing it even more because of political and economic constraints, not because they do not want to. An analogous perspective is perhaps most dominant in the literature on the political economy of protectionism (Grossman and Helpman 1995) . A common conclusion in this literature is that both political parties incline toward excessive protectionism.
The Theory of Electorally Constrained Power-Maximizing Parties3
The players are two federal parties {i, j} and a continuum of citizens whose measure is normalized to 1. Play is simultaneous, and in any Nash equilibrium (i) all citizens must vote for their most preferred federal party and (ii) both political parties must offer platforms that maximize their expected utility.
Citizen Preferences and Constraints
Citizen utility depends on not only consumption of private goods Pc and public goods G, but also on the political environment: Uc = u(Pc, G) + tIi.
(1) ~c " U[-0.5 + 1, 0.5 + It] is c's relative taste for party i versus party j. Tc is the amount of utility (positive or negative) the individual would be willing to give up in order to be ruled by i rather than j; P may be interpreted as both the average and the median value of Tc. Ii is an indicator variable, which is 1 if party i is in power and 0 otherwise; Ij = 1 -Ii.
Citizens' corresponding indirect utility function Zc is assumed to have functional form:
There are T distinct types of citizens, each with its own most desired level of government services, G*, which is uncorrelated with Tc. Each of these types constitutes a fraction X, of the population, so
t=l
Parties' Preferences and Constraints
The parties compete in an election held each period. Gi is the political platform offered by party i, and Gj is the platform ofj. The competing parties are both "power maximizers" who want government to be as big as possible assuming they are in office.4 Formally,
u, = I*U(Gj).
All properties of standard utility functions hold. It is further assumed that U(O) = 0: Controlling a government with no resources gives the same utility as being out of power.
Political Equilibrium with Certainty about Political Advantage
Because citizens vote to maximize their own utility, a citizen votes for federal party i if -P(Gi -G*)2 + c > -P(G, -G*)2
and for party j otherwise. Suppose that T can be observed without error by the political parties, and (for simplicity) 4 "Power-maximization" has two different interpretations in the literature. McGuire and Olson's (1996) self-interested autocrats maximize their tax revenues minus their expenditures; in consequence, government unconstrained by elections is too small. Brennan and Buchanan (1980), in contrast, equate power maximization with maximization of government spending, making the equilibrium size of government too large. These two approaches are not as different as they might appear: Since direct appropriation of surplus tax revenues is normally impermissible in democracies, politicians face the public-sector equivalent of rate-of-return regulation. The rational response to this cap is to let costs rise to eliminate monopoly profits. that a tie goes to i if P -0, and to j if T < 0. Given majority rule, it will then not be an equilibrium for both political parties to offer the median preference. If T -0, party i wins with certainty if it plays the median value of G; due to its advantaged position, it can definitely win even if its platform offers a somewhat larger public sector. Party i will want to keep increasing the offered level of government until it drives the percentage of votes it receives down to 0.5. Similarly, if t < 0, j wins with certainty if it exactly satisfies the median preference; due to its advantaged position, it can afford to offer a larger government.5 Consider first the case where T > 0. Assuming no corer solutions,6 party i can drag its share of the vote down to .5 if it pushes its offered platform up until it satisfies
t=! Due to disadvantaged status, in equilibrium, party j will never win. However, in equilibrium, j must still seek to maximize its votes: 
In the case where P < 0, it is merely necessary to switch the i and j subscripts and replace T with I1I. In general, then G = G + f/iWP where G is the value of the platform that wins in equilibrium. The advantaged party is always the winning party, which deviates as far from mean preferences as it can get away with without losing office.7 The disadvantaged party offers to set the size of government equal to the mean preference but invariably loses. Adding the assumption of "product differentiation" to democratic elections with perfect information has an outcome similar to that of the Bertrand duopoly game with cost advantages; the more intrinsically popular party always wins but is constrained by the presence of the alternative, less popular party. Note further that even when both parties are power maximizers, there will appear to be a "big government" and a "small government" party. The advantaged party consistently promotes a larger government than the disadvantaged party even though no ideological differences divide them. Figure 3 combines the two diagrams in a manner somewhat analogous to an Edgeworth box. The two parties' combined probability of winning must equal 1, and both parties maximize utility subject to the behavior of their competitor. In equilibrium, each party has its indifference curve tangent to its respective "budget constraint." The equilibrium points lie along a horizontal line, because the joint probability of victory is unity, but (in contrast to an Edgeworth box) there is no need for the equilibrium points to also be on the same vertical line. In fact, one would expect the disadvantaged party's platform to offer a smaller size of government because they are less able to afford deviations from voters' wishes. 
Empirical Tests of the Leviathan Hypothesis and Alternatives

Data and Variables8
This section tests the Leviathan and some alternative hypotheses using fiscal and political data for the 48 contiguous U.S. states from 1950-1989. For empirical purposes, it is necessary to quantify the size of government and the probability of electoral victory of the advantaged party. The size of government is measured in two ways: with states' real per-capita government spending (1982 dollars) and with spending as a fraction of personal income. The probability of electoral victory of the advantaged party is proxied by Distance, the fraction of legislative seats held by the ruling party; a party with a slim majority is assumed to have had a lower ex ante probability of victory than a party with a large supermajority. Formally, define Dempercent for a given legislative body as #Dem/(#Dem + #Rep). Then Distance I Dempercent -0.51, the absolute value of the difference between 50% and the percentage of seats held by the ruling Table 1 includes variable definitions; Table 2 shows the summary statistics of the data used and details on missing observations. 
The Leviathan Hypothesis: Preliminary Results
The Leviathan hypothesis predicts a positive correlation between Distance and the size of government. Before testing this null hypothesis against its main competitors, it is necessary to determine whether there is even a prima facie case that the Leviathan hypothesis is correct. To answer this question, total government spending and total taxation '0-both measured in real per-capita terms-were regressed on Distance and the standard control variables (state and year dummies, personal income, and federal grants). To check the sensitivity of the results to specification, I use both the lower and the upper houses of the state legislature to measure Distance. The "real per-capita" columns of Table 3 show the point estimates and standard errors of the interesting coefficients. The preliminary evidence matches the Leviathan model's predictions exactly: For both lower and upper measures, the impact of Distance on total spending and total taxation is positive and statistically significant. If Distance in the lower house of the state legislature increases from 0 to 0.1, total real per-capita spending is predicted to rise by $7.14, and total taxation by $11.59. If Distance increases by .1 in the upper house, spending goes up by $6.74 and taxation by $9.71.
It could be argued that it would be more informative to express fiscal variables as a percentage of personal income, rather than in absolute levels (and then drop personal income from the list of control variables). Using levels perhaps implausibly implies that the effect of 9 Note that 0 -Distance -0.5: The difference between the political balance and an even split ranges between 0% and 50%. The results are insensitive to choice of metric: replacing Distance with Distance2 makes little difference. 10 "Total" taxation is defined as the sum of sales, income, and corporate taxation. Note that in general, total spending considerably exceeds this measure of total taxation due to federal grants, deficit spending, and additional revenue sources. Distance is constant over time, even though the absolute size of the economy is constantly increasing. To alleviate this concern, the preliminary regressions were re-run using this alternative specification. The two rightmost columns of Table 3 
C. Alternative III: Fully Constrained
A third alternative is that political parties are fully constrained, and voter preferences are stable. In consequence, there is no connection between the probability of victory and parties' platforms. The objective function of parties makes no difference, because power-maximizing parties would find themselves forced to do the same thing as ideological parties. Empirically, this predicts that neither Distance nor Dempercent will have coefficients significantly different from zero.
D. Alternative IV: No Platform Preferences
A final alternative hypothesis is that parties have no platform preferences; they simply maximize their votes Londregan 1995, 1996; Grossman and Helpman 1996) . The implied equilibrium is straightforward: with certainty, both parties would offer the platform most preferred by the mean voter; with uncertainty, both parties would offer the platform that they expect the mean voter to most prefer. Like Alternative III, this predicts no connection between fiscal variables and Distance or Dempercent.
As Table 4 indicates, some of the alternative hypotheses yield the same predictions. Alternatives I and II both imply the size of government will be an increasing function of Dempercent. Additional empirical tests would be necessary to distinguish between them. Similarly, zero observed correlation of the size of government with either Distance or Dempercent would be consistent with both Alternative III and Alternative IV. The predictions of the Leviathan null hypothesis, however, do not readily follow from any other prominent alternative theories of the political process.
Leviathan Versus the Alternatives: Baseline Results
The first block of regressions looks at the effect of the political variables on total state spending and total taxation. As before, unless otherwise stated all specifications include state and year dummies and control for federal grants. Equations using real per-capita measures control for personal income; those using percentage of personal income measures do not. To check the sensitivity of the results, I continue to use both the lower and the upper houses to that the coefficients on Distance and Dempercent are equal. This is equivalent to saying that a larger Democratic majority increases the size of government in a statistically significant way, but a larger Republican majority does not. * There is a little evidence that changing the majority party has a discrete effect. The coefficients on Demmajority are only statistically significant in two equations out of four, but their signs are somewhat puzzling: positive for total taxes, negative for total spending. Subsequent sensitivity tests examine this finding's robustness.
Switching to percentage of personal income measures of fiscal variables (Table 5, 
Sensitivity Tests
Serial Correlation
The error terms in the preceding equations are highly serially correlated; after taking due account of the pooled nature of the data, the first-order serial correlation is usually around 0.75. To correct for this problem, all of the basic results from Table 5 were reestimated using the generalized method of moments (GMM), which is robust to serial correlation of unknown form. The first lags of total taxation and total spending were used as instruments, with all of the independent variables treated as exogenous.
Qualitatively, this correction leaves the fundamental results intact (coefficients not shown). The most noticeable difference is that the standard errors are larger. Because serial correlation leads only to inefficient rather than biased ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates, this is what one should expect. The estimated effect of Distance increases in absolute magnitude for all of Table 5 's equations while remaining positive and statistically significant. The effect of Dempercent also remains positive in all cases, but the magnitude and statistical significance of its coefficient is less robust. Dempercent is no longer statistically significant in any of the tax equations; when spending is measured as a percentage of personal income, the absolute magnitude of the coefficients stays roughly the same, but the coefficients cease to be statistically significant; in real per-capita terms, the effect of Dempercent on spending grows in magnitude but stays about the same in terms of statistical significance. The coefficient on Demmajority is less robust: Switching from OLS to GMM frequently changes its sign and increases its absolute magnitude. Overall, then, correcting for serial correlation using GMM makes Distance look more important, and Dempercent less important.
Multicollinearity and VIFs
The high R2's in Table 5 suggest that there may be a high degree of multicollinearity at work, especially for the central variables of Demmajority, Dempercent, and Distance. In order to weigh the seriousness of this problem, variance inflating factors (VIFs) were computed for each of these variables using both the lower and upper house data. The findings were fairly reassuring. The VIFs for both measures of Distance were less than 3.5; the VIFs for both measures of Demmajority were less than 5; and the VIFs for lower and upper house Dempercent were 8.4 and 9.1, respectively. In no case did a VIF exceed Gujarati's recommended threshold of 10 for "high collinearity" (Gujarati 1995, p. 339) .
The South
While all of the basic results use state dummies, the long-enduring one-party systems in the South do raise the possibility that uniquely Southern factors drive the results. To address this concern, Table 5's results were reestimated after dropping the eleven southern states. The main finding here (coefficients not shown) is that the predictive power of Distance is actually much more robust than that of Dempercent. Using nonsouthern data only, the magnitude and statistical significance of Distance stays about the same for all tax equations, and for spending as a fraction of personal income.12 Dempercent, in contrast, is only statistically significant in two of the tax equations. Thus, there is some reason to think that the apparent effect of Democratic control actually stems from peculiarities of the South. In contrast, the effect of lopsided partisan control is much more robust.
Controlling for Governor's Party
The empirical results in Table 5 
Other Sensitivity Tests
The results in Table 5 all look separately at the impact of the lower and upper houses. The regressions were redone using two alternate specifications (coefficients not shown). In one specification, parties' seats in both houses of the legislature were added together to calculate the values of Demmajority, Dempercent, and Distance. This specification leaves the results virtually Table 5 is that the coefficient on Demmajority in the spending equations is always negative, not positive or zero as one would expect. Because the negative coefficient on Demmajority is only statistically significant one time out of four in Table 5 , it might be more informative to simply drop it from the specification. Table 6 shows that if one drops Demmajority from Table 5 and reestimates, all of the main findings persist.
Analysis of Results
Magnitudes
As a fraction of income, the predicted magnitude of the impact of partisan composition initially seems small. In the main specifications, moving from an evenly divided chamber to one in which a single party holds all of the seats never increases spending as a fraction of income by more than 1 percentage point. But the effect is much more striking if one looks at the predicted magnitude as a fraction of the state budget. For a theory of the impact of partisan composition on spending, this is probably a better metric of the economic importance of the results.
Over the sample period, the state budget consumes $931 real per-capita on average-or about 10% of personal income. Netting the impact of both Distance and Dempercent implies approximately zero budgetary impact of greater Republican majorities, no matter how lopsided.'4 But the net impact of greater Democratic majorities relative to the state budget is substantial. The Table 6 results predict that increasing the Democrats' majority in the lower house by .1 raises real per-capita spending by $14.8. For the average state budget of $931, this means a rise of 1.6%. Alternately, the lower house results for Table 6 For Democrats, ideology and political advantage augment each other. They want to make government larger on ideological grounds, but they also like having more power. For Republicans, in contrast, ideology and advantage pull in opposite directions. Ideologically, they want to make government smaller, but like their Democratic competitors, they also want more power.
14 As noted previously, for the total spending equations one cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficients on Distance and Dempercent are equal, implying that the impact of greater Republican majorities is not significantly different from zero. 15 Still, the last section's robustness checks suggest that the null should not be entirely ruled out. The role of Dempercent does diminish after correcting for serial correlation or excluding southern states from the sample. 16 Alternative I lends itself to this compromise more readily than Alternative II, which posits perfectly constrained parties.
The positive coefficient on Distance suggests that parties have some degree of slack. It is still possible, however, that voter preference shifts partly explain the policy changes the accompany changes in partisan composition.
For Democrats, ideology amplifies their nonideological urge to make government bigger. For Republicans, ideology dampens this same urge. In other words, greater advantage makes it feasible for both parties to expand the size of the public sector. However, because the parties' ideological views differ, Democrats expand the size of the public sector as much as politically possible, whereas Republicans are less eager to seize this opportunity when it presents itself.
Do Parties Differ along Other Margins?
When Democratic majorities become more lopsided, total taxation and total spending grow; when Republican majorities become more lopsided, total taxation and total spending barely change. Conflicting ideology theories seem to overstate how much the parties differ on the total level of taxation and spending. Do the parties differ along other margins? In particular, do the parties prefer to use their political slack to change the composition of taxes and spending rather than its level? This section searches for less obvious differences between the parties by examining the sensitivity of different types of taxation and spending to Distance and Dempercent.
Main Results
The data set partitions total taxation into sales, income, and corporate taxation, and total spending into spending on education, health and hospitals, highways, public welfare, and "other." Each of these fiscal components was regressed on Distance, Dempercent, Demmajority, and the standard set of control variables. Table 7 shows the interesting coefficients using real per-capita measures. Table 8 Table 7 (real per capita), but positive and significant in Table 8 (percentage of personal income). * Republicans actually seem more inclined than Democrats to increase spending on health and hospitals: Dempercent's coefficient is always negative and usually significant. Health spending's link to Distance is less clear: the sign is always positive, but significant only for upper Distance.
* Dempercent has large negative effects on highway spending, however measured, but Distance only has a negative effect in Table 7 . Either way, Democrats drastically cut highway spending when their political dominance becomes greater, while Republicans on net increase highway spending as their electoral position improves. The negative coefficient on Dempercent is consistent with standard perceptions of the parties' ideological positions on mass transit versus automobiles.'7 Glazer (1989) provides a possible strategic rationale for a negative coefficient on Distance: When parties are confident that they have a secure majority, they are less inclined to try to "bind the hands" of future administrations by spending more on durable goods during the current period. * Distance and Dempercent always have significant and positive coefficients in the equations for public welfare spending, confirming earlier findings of Gilligan and Matsusaka (1995) . The same pattern also appears for "other" spending.
Analysis
The Leviathan hypothesis wrongly assumes that parties share identical goals, but the alternatives that attribute different objective functions to the parties overemphasize spending levels rather than spending composition. While most models of platform divergence in political economy emphasize the level of spending and taxation, their composition matters at least as much. Tables 7 and 8 show that parties exhibit important differences on what they tax and how they spend. 18 Democrats are more prone to raise income and corporate taxes than sales taxes. Yet the positive coefficient on Distance dampens or even reverses any tendency of income and corporate taxes to fall as Republican majorities increase. In three of the five spending categories-education, public welfare, and "other"-Democrats are predictably likely to make spending greater than Republicans would given the same degree of political slack. But for the remaining components of spending-health and hospital, and highways-the coefficients on Dempercent are negative. Republicans are actually more inclined to increase spending on these parts of the budget than Democrats are.
Aggregation thus conceals important compositional shifts. Even when total spending is stable, altering the legislature's partisan composition permits large changes in some kinds of spending. Democrats have a particularly strong tendency to reduce highway spending (and, to a lesser extent, health and hospital spending) as their political position becomes more secure. This enables them to increase public welfare and "other" spending by much more than would appear possible if one simply looked at the change in total spending. Republicans increase spending on highways as their political position becomes more secure; they manage to restrain the growth in total spending by slashing public welfare spending.
One possible explanation for these compositional differences is ideological. This is consistent with the positive connection between Dempercent and income and corporate taxes, as well as education and public welfare spending. The strong negative relationship between highway spending and Dempercent also fits conventional ideological stereotypes. In other cases, "pork barrel" explanations may fit the facts better: Health and hospital spending has at most a tenuous connection to Republican ideology.
Some have seen ideology as little more than a way to credibly commit to certain pork barrel policies (Bender and Lott 1996) . On the other hand, recent theorizing suggests that pork barrel explanations may be unable to explain why the parties' spending patterns differ at all. Dixit and Londregan (1995) find that both parties will tend to target money on "swing voters"-politically central, relatively nonideological, yet nonaffluent constituencies. To get the contrary "machine politics" result, one needs the special assumption that parties can better deliver pork to their core support groups than to swing voters (Dixit and Londregan 1996) . Deciding between these explanations must be left to future research; the parties' divergent spending patterns merit more intensive study, especially when the data show that ideological stereotypes oversimplify the facts.
Conclusion
As recent literature in political economy emphasizes, imperfections in political and economic competition leave slack for politicians to pursue their own agendas. But what agendas do politicians want to pursue? Do they, as in Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) or Dixit and Londregan (1998), divide up between pro-and antigovernment ideology? Or, as the public choice tradition argues and as the theoretical model presented here assumes, do politicians on both sides of the fence want to maximize their power?
Both classes of models seem to explain part of the data. The main empirical problem with the Leviathan model is that it dismisses ideological differences between parties too swiftly. Democrats definitely appear more likely to increase spending when they have a large majority, even controlling for state effects, year effects, personal income, and federal grants. Corporate income tax collections tend to rise with larger Democratic majorities and fall with larger Republican majorities. Differences in ideology might also explain why Democrats and Republicans shift the composition of government spending as their hold on the legislature becomes more lopsided, although a "pork barrel" explanation for these comovements should not be ruled out.
However, there is an asymmetry in the data that models emphasizing divergent party ideology fail to capture: A peculiar kind of big government bias exists. Spending grows as Democratic majorities grow, but it does not fall even when Republicans enjoy a supermajority position. If antigovernment ideology influences Republicans' policies, it mainly does so by restraining the expansion of the public sector, rather than prompting cuts. Ideological models of party behavior under imperfect political competition need to be supplemented by a powermaximizing model to deal with these findings. Future research on the economics of imperfect political competition should explore the complementary roles of ideology and power maximization in greater depth.
